摘要

Anticorruption enforcement is normally considered a prerequisite for building an effective bureaucracy, but why some bureaucrats in China respond to intensified corruption crackdowns with slack remains less understood. This article suggests that anticorruption enforcement triggering bureaucratic slack is contingent on the institutional framework. Drawing on a panel dataset in China from 2011 to 2016, this study reveals that in cities without reform of the administrative approval system, draconian anti-corruption drives dispel informal practices and trigger risk aversion among bureaucrats, leading to bureaucratic slack in promoting the local economy. In cities with the administrative reform, bureaucratic slack does not occur.

引用

Wenyan Tu,Xiaoming Zhang & Xiangyi Zheng.(2025).Does Anti-Corruption Enforcement Trigger Bureaucratic Slack in China? The Moderating Effect of an Administrative Reform.Problems of Post-Communism,72(6),558-570.https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2025.2482214.