1. Populism has relationship issues: collider effects and immigration policy in Italy  

   Dwayne Woods, Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA

This article makes the simple argument that populism is not poorly defined. Rather, this proverbial claim arises from a misunderstanding of concepts and their use. I argue that confusion is linked to a semantic approach to defining a concept. The semantic approach assumes a precise definition of a concept corresponding to some objective phenomena. The main argument is that populism is inherently a collider conceptual variable. The article looks at how it interacts with nationalism and nativism and how this colliding dimension shapes immigration policy in Italy. This article makes two original contributions. First, the paper argues that populism does not have a definitional problem. The second contribution is the use of a case study of immigration in Italy to examine how the colliding effect of populism with nativism and nationalism empirically affects policy framing and implementation.

2. American populism: dimensions, distinctions, and correlates 

   David C. Barker, American University, Washington, USA

   Ryan DeTamble, American University, Washington, USA

At a time when American “populism” has become a more commonly referenced concern, buzzword, and subject of academic research, conceptual clarity is imperative. This study aims to make some progress by exploring the dimensions and covariates of populism within the mass public. We differentiate economic populists, cultural populists, and ideologically constrained populists, who differ substantially from each other with respect age, gender, education, income, some personality traits, and moral foundations. We also distinguish each of these populist veins from other orientations that are often mis-labeled as populism, such as nativism, nationalism, and authoritarianism—noting points of convergence and divergence. Moreover, with respect to political orientations, we observe that economic populists are usually ideologically “liberal” and Democratic, while cultural populists are usually “conservative” and Republican. Finally, we find that cultural populists exhibit disproportionate levels of political obstinacy, whereas ideologically constrained populists exhibit disproportionate levels of socio-political contempt.

3. Populists, authoritarians, or securitarians? Policy preferences and threats to democratic governance in the modern age 

    John R. Hibbing, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, USA

What really motivates the hardcore followers of leaders, such as Viktor Orban in Hungary, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Narendra Modi in India, and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines? According to standard accounts, it is either a desire for strong authoritative leaders or a desire to empower ordinary people at the expense of elites. Using the ardent supporters of Donald Trump as a case study, I argue that conventional wisdom is unable to explain important recent events such as the documented tendency of Trump supporters to defy COVID-19-inspired authoritative mandates to wear masks and socially distance. On the basis of original survey data, I suggest that the real motivation of Trump supporters and by extension the supporters of similar leaders around the world is an intense desire for policies that protect the insider core of society from the threats posed by human outsiders, such as immigrants, minorities, and norm violators.

4. A flash in the pan: why was UKIP’s electoral achievement so short-lived?

   Hongqiang Lyu, School of Public Administration, Hangzhou Normal University, China

   Youxing Lang, Department of Political Science, Zhejiang University, China

Why did the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) achieve short-term electoral success before the 2016 Brexit referendum but lose most of its support afterward? Where did its constituency go? This paper constructs an analytical framework to explain the electoral fate of UKIP across three dimensions: party ability, voter preferences and institutional constraints. Based on individual level data and case analysis, we summarize the supporting and inhibiting factors that influence the rise and fall of UKIP. The core point is that UKIP used the Eurozone and refugee crises to criticize the policy framework of mainstream parties and governments, and to propose radical responses to successfully attract or mobilize voters. However, the victory achieved through the referendum also weakened the dissatisfaction of voters, thereby reducing the electoral competitiveness of UKIP in taking advantage of new issues that might attract the support of constituencies aroused by Brexit. This rise and meteoric descent for UKIP shows that its base is unstable and its voters are mostly protesters rather than loyalists. The majority of voters who abandoned UKIP turned to the Conservative Party. This can be interpreted in two ways. One is that the mainstream party has been shifting rightward from a nationalistic standpoint; the other is that the right-wing populist movement may affect the mainstream party system to varying degrees.

5. How the European Union responded to populism and its implications for public sector reforms

   Edoardo Ongaro, Faculty of Business and Law, The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK

   Fabrizio Di Mascio, Interuniversity Department of Regional and Urban Studies and Planning, University of Turin, Italy

   Alessandro Natalini, Department of Law, Economics, Politics and Modern Languages, Lumsa University of Rome, Italy

A major shift occurred in the European Union (EU) approach to tackle the apparently unstoppable rise of populist parties across European countries and to preserve the integrity of the EU polity. EU economic governance seems to have shifted from a logic of conditionality to a logic of solidarity underpinned by a pan-European strategic view allowing EU governance to support and enable public sector reforms at the national level. By investigating the case of Italy as an EU member state, we find that the European governance shift occurring in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic was largely mediated by the mutating character of Italian populism. A logic of conditionality which was largely centered around EU governance was largely shifted to a logic of solidarity taking into account political conditions in the member countries.

6. What has populism ever done for you? Are populist governments successful in producing economic and social change? 

   B. Guy Peters, Maurice Falk Professor of Government, University of Pittsburgh, USA

The rhetoric of populism stresses benefiting “the people” who have been ignored by a corrupt elite, whether that elite is political or economic. If the reality is to match the rhetoric, then populist governments should provide social and economic benefits for the public, including healthcare, education, and income redistribution. This paper examines the effects of populist governments in the American South during the time of the Great Depression on a number of indicators of social and economic well-being. The general finding is that the populist governments were successful in the short term in producing changes, but that these changes were not sustained over time.

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